The Dictator's Handbook

靖博 阅读:1519 2018-02-27 13:54:54 评论:0

本周的指定阅读书目中有一本很有趣,是开学以来我读到的最吸引我的一本。教授要求只读第1,2章,读完我立即决定通读全书。

书名“The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics”,作者:Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith,2011年出版。

有人说这本书cynical(愤世嫉俗),我不这么看。下面我们来简要整理一下这本书(前两章)的脉络和要点。

首先,作者提出所有的entity(实体),不论是政府还是公司,都面临三个最基本的核心人群:

1)The Nominal Selectorate(“The Interchangeables”) — the pool of all potential supporters

(靖博试译)名义上的代表选举人(可替换选举人),指所有潜在的支持者群体。

2)The Real Selectorate(“The Influentials”) — the supporters who actually choose the leader

真正的代表选举人(有影响力的选举人),指实际选择领导人的支持者群体。

3)The Winning Coalition(“The Essentials”) — the key people who keep the leader in power

获胜同盟(关键选举人),指确保领导人掌握权力的关键人物

任何领导人维持权力的关键在于让第三个支持者群体(关键选举人)满意。以上三个群体的相对规模是领导人得以行使领导权的决定因素。

Leaders remain in power by keeping The Winning Coalition happy. The relative sizes of each of the three groups above dictate how the leader governs.

美国为例,全体选民就是上面所说的interchangeables,因为每个人都有选票,但选举结果对每个人的个体影响很小。选举委员会(the electoral college)是the influentials,因为最终的选举由这个委员会进行。而真正决定影响选举结果,并直接受到选举结果影响的是选举委员会中分配给各州的投票人,这个很小的群体是最关键的因素。

作者举加州的小城市Bell为例,2009年,Bell共有9395名注册选民(interchangeables),2235实际投票人(influentials),而真正关键的是473名投票人,最终决定该市的选举结果。

很多大公司也有类似的结构。例如上市公司成千上万的持股人(interchangeables),其中的机构投资人是influentials,而最终是少数一拨人才有能力选定董事局成员和高级管理层,这是公司的essentials.

作者认为民主体制和极权体制在对待和利用以上三个支持者群体方面区别不大。Governments do not differ in kind. They differ along the dimensions of their selectorates and winning coalitions.

合理管理以上三个支持者群体就是行使权力的艺术。

首先,领导人如何使用金钱、资源?将主要资源投入公共领域使公民全体受益还是主要投入给关键的essential群体以换取他们的忠诚(buy loyalty)?

在民主体制下,由于essentials群体规模较大,很难通过个体奖励来获取忠诚。所以民主体制领导人不得不将社会资源大部分导向公共领域投资,以惠及大众,即the interchangeables,或全体选民。

在专制体制下,或在公司架构中,领导人由于无需考虑来自interchangeables的不满压力,倾向于利用个体奖励的手段获取少数essentials的忠心。想想朝鲜对高级军官的待遇不难理解。

税收制度

(以下两段不便翻译,请读者自行学习

When the coalition of essential backers is small and private goods are an efficient way to stay in power, then the well-being of the broader population falls by the wayside, contrary to the view expressed by Hobbes. In this setting leaders want to tax heavily, redistributing wealth by taking as much as they can from the poor interchangeables and the disenfranchised(指无投票权的公民),giving that wealth in turn to the members of the winning coalition, making them fat, rich, and loyal.

For example, a married couple in the United States pays no income tax on the first $17,000 they earn. At the same income, a Chinese couple’s marginal tax rate is 45 percent.

Shuffling the essential deck核心权力洗牌

作者以卡斯特罗革命成功后对切格瓦拉等革命战友的清洗为例,of the twenty-one ministers appointed by Castro in January 1959, immediately after the success of his revolution, 12 had resigned or had been ousted by the end of the year. Four more were removed in 1960 as Castro further consolidated his hold on power.

这一节内容在中国历史上屡见不鲜,作者是不知道赵匡胤和朱元璋的故事。天下皇帝都是一样的心思。

Che(指切格瓦拉)may have been second in power only to Fidel(指卡斯特罗)himself . Indeed, that was likely his greatest fault. Castro forced Che out of Cuba in 1965 partly because of Che’s popularity, which made him a potential rival for authority.

纵观中国历史,哪个朝代不是一样的模式呢?

Political transitions are filled with examples of supporters who help a leader to power only to be replaced.

这背后的心理逻辑是,当权者一旦获得权力,就需要把winning coalition减小到最小规模,以此降低其购买忠诚的成本。

If a small bloc of backers is needed and it can be drawn from a large pool of potential supporters, then the incumbent(当权者)doesn’t need to spend a huge proportion of the regime’s revenue to buy the coalition’s loyalty.所以你看中国古代聪明的开国功臣都会在第一时间告老还乡,而新皇帝都需要把这些功高的人换掉或干掉,以降低忠诚度的获取成本。

作者进一步提出,不论民主体制还是专制体制的领导者,都需要遵循五个确保其权力安全的黄金法则。

1. Keep your winning coalition as small as possible.

2. Keep your nominal selectorate as large as possible.(潜在支持者的规模越大,领导人越能给有影响力的选举人以被替换的压力,以此获取其被迫的支持。)

3. Control the flow of revenue.起义成功后的第一步一定是抢占资源控制权。例如李自成进京后干的那一套。

4. Pay your key supporters just enough to keep them loyal.作者举了津巴布韦穆加贝为例说明领导人对其关键支持者施以合理恩惠以获得需要的忠诚的艺术。为什么要just enough?因为, Give your coalition just enough so that they don’t shop around for someone to replace you and not a penny more.三哥也是这一条的高手。

5. Don’t take money out of your supporter’s pocket to make the people’s lives better.

作者举了一个俄国革命的例子很有趣。

Czar Nicholas(尼古拉斯沙皇)confused what might seem like a good public policy with bad political decision making.他干了一件什么蠢事呢?

一战中,这位沙皇认为俄军酗酒严重影响了战斗力,于是颁布了一条对伏特加酒的禁令。他忘了一个关键问题——伏特加的销售税收是当时俄国全国收入的三分之一。

With vodka banned, his revenue diminished sharply.没了钱,也就没有购买忠诚的资本。尼古拉斯沙皇的禁酒政策最终导致了亚历山大-卡伦斯基领导的二月革命成功推翻了沙皇统治。但卡伦斯基试图在俄国建立民主政府迅速失败,这是后话,此不谈。

不能再说了,这本书太恐怖,根本停不下来……

参考阅读

英国金融时报(FT)书评 https://www.ft.com/content/3eb31cf6-1049-11e1-8211-00144feabdc0

英国卫报(the Guardian)书评 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/19/dictators-handbook-de-mesquita-review

【请先登陆社交账号再留言,顺序错误会导致留言丢失。】
发表评论
在线课程
Courera - Earn your Degree Online
站内搜索